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Abstract: This study assesses the incidence of pollution control policies on 
households. In contrast to previous studies, we employ an integrated framework 
combining a multisector general equilibrium model with a stochastic dominance 
analysis using household-level data. We consider three policy instruments in a 
domestic emission trading system: (i) an output-based allocation of permits (OBA); 
(ii) the use of the proceeds of permit sales to reduce payroll taxes (RPT); (iii) and the 
use of these proceeds to reduce consumption taxes instead (UCS). The general 
equilibrium results suggest that the return to capital is more negatively affected than 
the wage rate in all simulations, since polluting industries are capital intensive. 
Abstracting from pollution externalities, the dominance analysis allows us to conclude 
that all three policies have a normatively robust negative (positive) impact on welfare 
(poverty). Formal dominance tests indicate that RPT first-order welfare dominates 
OBA over all values of household incomes. UCS also first-order poverty dominates 
RPT for any choice of poverty line below $CAN 18,600, and poverty dominates for 
any poverty line (and thus welfare dominates) at the second order. Finally, while the 
three pollution control policies do not have a numerically large impact on inequality 
(in comparison to the base run), statistical tests indicate that inequality increases 
significantly more with OBA and RPT than with UCS. 
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Résumé: Cet article évalue l’incidence des politiques de lutte contre la pollution sur 
le niveau de vie des ménages. Contrairement aux études précédentes, nous utilisons 
une approche intégrée combinant un modèle d’équilibre général multisectoriel avec 
une analyse de dominance stochastique basée sur des données de ménages. Nous 
considérons trois instruments de politique dans le cadre d’un système d’échange de 
droits d’émission : (i) une allocation de permis basée sur la production (OBA), (ii) 
l’utilisation du revenu de vente des permis pour réduire la taxe sur la masse salariale 
(RPT), (iii) et l’utilisation des revenus pour réduire la taxe sur la consommation 
(UCS). Les résultats du modèle d’équilibre général suggèrent que la rémunération du 
capital est plus affectée que le salaire dans toutes les simulations étant donnée la 
forte intensité capitalistique des industries polluantes. Abstraction faite des 
externalités créées par la pollution, l’analyse de dominance nous permet de conclure 
que les trois politiques ont, sur un plan normatif, de manière robuste un impact 
négatif (positif) sur le bien-être (la pauvreté). Les tests formels de dominance en 
bien-être indiquent que RPT domine au premier ordre OBA pour toutes les valeurs 
de revenus des ménages. UCS domine également au premier ordre RPT pour tout 
seuil de pauvreté inférieur à 18 600 $CAN, et au second ordre pour tout seuil de 
pauvreté. Enfin, alors que les trois politiques de lutte contre la pollution n’ont pas un 
impact important sur l’inégalité (en comparaison à la situation de référence), les tests 
statistiques indiquent que l’inégalité augmente davantage avec OBA et RPT qu’avec 
UCS. 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
In recent years, much of the debate over the cost of pollution control policies
has centered on their aggregate cost-effectiveness and not on their distributive
welfare incidence. Yet, the distributive outcome of any policy that affects relative
prices constitutes an important source of concern for policy makers. Concern
for the incidence of the costs of green-house gas (GHG) abatement policies can
be expressed from at least two perspectives: industries and households. With
the first perspective, the concern is over the incidence of abatement costs across
industries; with the second perspective, it is the policies’ welfare incidence on
households that is the main source of concern. The interest over the joint incidence
of pollution control policies has been growing among researchers. A recent body
of literature has begun to examine the distributive impact across industries of the
cost of pollution control policies. Dissou (2006) and Goulder, Parry, Williams III,
and Burtraw (1999) are just a few examples. The literature on the household
incidence of environmental taxes is also increasingly abundant — see for instance
Parry, Sigman, Walls, and Williams III (2005) for an interesting and extensive
review of the literature.
Most studies suggest that environmental taxes tend to be regressive. The main
reason for this is that lower income households usually spend a larger share of
their income on energy goods than more affluent households; increasing taxes on
energy goods is thus proportionately more harmful to poorer households. Many
such studies use a partial equilibrium analysis in which it is assumed not only that
energy taxes are fully passed through to consumers, but also that these taxes have
no effects on the prices of other goods. West and Williams (2004) and Bento,
Goulder, Henry, Jacobsen, and von Haefen (2005) are a few examples of studies
using such a partial equilibrium approach.
Considering the significant share of energy goods in the production cost of
other consumption goods, the above conclusion on the regressive nature of envi-
ronmental taxes could certainly be qualified in a more general equilibrium setting.
For example, Solow (1985) and Uri and Boyd (1997) find that when the indirect
effects, i.e., the spillover and feedback effects from other industries, of energy
taxes, such as a thermal tax, are taken into consideration, energy taxes tend to
be proportional — as opposed to being regressive when these effects are ignored.
Accounting for the indirect effects of energy taxes on other goods through input-
output tables, Casler and Rafiqui (1993) also find that these taxes are then only
mildly regressive.
In a recent paper, Fullerton and Heutel (2007) discuss another channel through
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which environmental taxes can have a redistributive impact across households.
As polluting industries tend to be relatively capital intensive, the use of market-
based instruments to control emissions, under certain conditions on substitution
elasticities, tends to reduce the relative return of capital to labor. Such a backward
shift of a pollution tax on primary factors will then affect the distributive incidence
of the tax since richer households generally derive a higher share of their income
from capital.
The analysis of the incidence of environmental taxes can therefore be im-
proved by considering the indirect effects of the taxes on the prices of other prod-
ucts and on factor returns. Existing general equilibrium analyses of the household
incidence of environmental policy, such as Rose and Oladosu (2002) and Wiese
and Schluter (1995), are nevertheless limited in their ability to show the distribu-
tive impacts of policies affecting relative prices. In contrast to partial equilibrium
studies, which usually rely on detailed household-level survey data, existing gen-
eral equilibrium studies indeed only include a rather limited number of represen-
tative households. Because of their aggregative nature, they are unable to take
fully into account the considerable heterogeneity that can exist across households.
The distributive changes suggested by these models only capture redistribution
between groups, ignoring intra-group changes. The latter can only be accounted
for fully using microeconomic household-level survey data.
This paper draws upon the strengths of both of the approaches described above
by accounting for both general equilibrium effects and household-level hetero-
geneity in incomes and consumption. To do this, we use a two-step approach in
which we first compute the general equilibrium effects on commodity prices and
on primary factor returns, and then perform stochastic dominance analysis using
household-level data.
A recurring insight derived of most studies on the economic cost of environ-
mental policies is that the final outcome depends on the policy instrument used
and on the method for recycling the revenue raised by these instruments. We thus
consider three domestic emissions trading (DET) experiments: (i) a DET with an
output-based allocation of permits (OBA); (ii) a DET with a recycling of permit
proceeds to reduce payroll taxes (RPT); and (iii) a DET with a recycling of permit
proceeds to reduce consumption taxes (UCS). While the last two types of DET are
well known in the literature, the first is relatively new and is gaining popularity
among policy makers in Europe and North America. An interesting characteristic
of the OBA-DET is that it helps to even the distributive impact of pollution control
policies across industries — see Dissou (2006), Bernard, Fischer, and Fox (2007)
Goulder, Parry, Williams III, and Burtraw (1999) for an analysis of the cost- effec-
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tiveness of an OBA-DET scheme. We are not aware of any study that compares
the household incidence of these types of emission trading.
We consider the Canadian economy, for which we elect to analyze the impact
of a 15% reduction of GHG emissions from their business-as-usual (BAU) level
using a cap-and-trade DET with different revenue-recycling methods. Note that
this analysis does not have any link with official government policies to reduce
GHG emissions in Canada. It is only done illustratively in order to derive some
insights on the distributional impacts of alternative GHG mitigation policies using
our suggested methodology.
For that purpose, the paper develops a multi-sector static general equilib-
rium model of the Canadian economy. This serves to provide the commodity
and primary input price impacts of the three policy experiments described above.
The commodity and primary input price changes obtained from the general equi-
librium model are subsequently used in a stochastic dominance analysis using
household-level data.
The dominance approach to assess the distributive and welfare implication
of taxes is relatively well established in the public finance literature — see for
instance Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991), Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995) and Duclos,
Makdissi, and Wodon (forthcoming). Using stochastic dominance for analyzing
the social welfare impact of policy has several advantages. The most important
of these is to free the analysis from the need to make restrictive and arbitrary
assumptions on the way in which social welfare is assessed. As we will see in
greater details below, stochastic dominance can indeed be used to conclude that
an environmental policy is good for society regardless of whether the normative
focus is on poverty reduction or on social welfare improvement, of whether a
particular social welfare function is used as opposed to another, and of whether
one or another poverty line is chosen. In short, using the dominance approach
helps free the analysis from difficult measurement and normative choices, and thus
helps make a policy conclusion more robust and less ambiguous. We are not aware
of other studies analyzing the household incidence of environmental policies using
a stochastic dominance approach, especially in a general equilibrium framework.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical
framework used. Section 3 presents the data and describes the policy experiments.
Section 4 discusses the results. Final remarks are presented in Section 5.
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2 Analytical framework
2.1 The general equilibrium model
This section provides a cursory description of the general equilibrium model
used in this study. It is an improved version of the static general equilibrium model
used in Dissou (2005). The model builds upon recent contributions to the literature
related to the general equilibrium modelling of OBA emissions trading by Dissou
(2006) and Goulder, Parry, Williams III, and Burtraw (1999). It is a static mul-
tisector general equilibrium model of the Canadian economy, with endogenous
labour supply. It is suitable for analyzing the aggregate as well as the sectoral im-
pacts of alternative environmental policies that rely on market-based instruments.
The model tracks combustion CO2 emissions emanating only from the use of fos-
sil fuels. It disaggregates the production sector into sixty-one industries in order
to take into account differences in sectoral energy intensities. The model also dis-
tinguishes six types of fossil products: coal, natural gas, motor gasoline, diesel,
liquid petroleum gases and ”other refined petroleum and coal products”. Canada
is modelled as a small open economy that produces and consumes tradable goods
and where all domestic economic agents operate in a competitive framework.
2.1.1 Production structure
To produce the composite output of the representative firm in each industry,
a constant-return-to-scale technology combines primary factors (labour and capi-
tal), various types of energy inputs, and material inputs. The model entails a de-
composition of the production structure into a sequential decision process to make
the production function weakly separable with several hierarchical sub-nests.
The representation of the technology allows for various substitution possibil-
ities among different types of fossil fuels, between fossil and non-fossil energy,
between labour and the composite of capital and energy and between the index of
value-added energy and intermediate inputs. A Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) aggregator function is used in all nests with special values (one or zero)
occasionally. Labour and physical capital are mobile across industries. The rep-
resentative firm considers all (output and input) prices as given. It determines the
optimal levels of input use and output production by maximizing profits, consid-
ering prices and taxes as given. It pays payroll taxes and other production taxes.
Using the Armington assumption, a constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
function is used to transform the output into domestic sales and exports. The firm
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uses a revenue maximization approach to determine the optimal level of sales in
the two markets.
2.1.2 Demand structure
Households
The representative household derives income from wages, dividends, govern-
ment and foreign transfers. Its preferences are represented by a Stone Geary utility
function (also called “Linear Expenditure System”, or LES) in which are nested
different hierarchical levels of CES functions. At the top level, the representative
household derives utility from leisure and from the index of consumption com-
modities, using the LES aggregator function. At the lower level, the index of
consumption commodities is a nested CES function of all commodities available
in Canada, including energy goods. In parallel to firms, the household’s prefer-
ence structure is sequential in order to allow substitution between energy and non-
energy goods, on the one hand, and substitution among different energy products,
on the other.
The government
Government revenue comes from indirect taxes on domestic goods and pro-
duction activities, from taxes on international transactions (imports), and from
direct taxes on the remuneration of primary factors. The government also collects
the proceeds of permit sales that are recycled using different methods, which are
described further in the paper. Government consumption of each commodity is
fixed in real terms. Its other outlays consist of transfers to households that are
also fixed in real terms, and of permit-revenue-recycling expenditures. Unless
otherwise mentioned, the government adjusts the latter component of its spending
so as to keep constant its budget balance.
Other components of domestic absorption
Total domestic demand for each commodity is the sum of all domestic de-
mands by households, government and firms for consumption, intermediate pro-
duction and investment. A CES function is used to capture the differentiation and
imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic commodities. A cost-
minimization rule allows the determination of the optimal level of each compo-
nent of domestic absorption.
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2.1.3 Equilibrium conditions and closure rules
The general equilibrium of the model is characterized by an allocation of
goods and factors such that (i) the endogenously determined prices clear all mar-
kets, (ii) all agents respect their budget constraints, and (iii) the total level of CO2
emissions meets the specified reduction target. As Canada is considered to be
a small open economy, world import and export prices are fixed. The model is
closed by considering foreign savings and government savings to be exogenous
and by choosing the nominal exchange rate as the nume´raire. The real exchange
rate adjusts to bring about the balance of payments equilibrium.
2.1.4 Carbon dioxide emissions and carbon permits
In the DET system, the requirement to hold a permit for each unit of emission
imposes a penalty on the use of fossil fuels depending on their carbon content.
We consider an upstream DET system in which all suppliers and importers of
fossil fuels are required to buy their permits in an auctioned market. The required
amount of tradable permits related to the use of a given fossil fuel varies positively
with its carbon content. If the constraint on total emissions is binding, the equilib-
rium permit price should be strictly positive and passed on the prices paid by the
users (intermediate and final) of the fossil fuels. In a general equilibrium setting,
as fossil fuels are used as intermediate inputs in some industries, the increase in
their prices should impact on the consumer prices of other goods and especially on
those of energy intensive goods, We discuss the recycling of the permit proceeds
in section 3.2 on the simulations’ description.
2.2 Welfare analysis
We now turn to the assessment of the impact of GHG mitigation policies on
social welfare1. Two important informational problems arise at this stage. The
first is to estimate the impact of price changes on individual welfare. The second
problem resides in the choice of a social evaluation function with which the social
(or global) impact is to be assessed. We consider each problem in turn.
1Note that we do not include in this analysis the environmental benefits of a reduced level of
pollution.
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2.2.1 The impact of price changes on individual welfare
To address the difficulty of estimating the impact of price changes on the dis-
tribution of individual welfare, we focus on the impact of marginal GHG reforms.
To see what this means, let the direct utility function of individual i be defined by
Ui(x
1
i , . . . , x
J
i ; yi) (1)
and his budget constraint be given by
yi =
J∑
j=1
qjx
j
i +
K∑
j=J+1
qjx
j
i , (2)
where qj = rj(1 + τj) is the market price of good j, rj is the producer price
of good j, τj is the tax rate on good j, yi is the exogenous income of individual
i, xji is the net demand for good j from individual i (including net savings and
the net demand for production factors), j = 1, ..., J are consumption goods, and
j = J +1, ..., K are the production factors provided by households (for which the
net demand xji is thus negative). In a general equilibrium setting, we can think of
rj as a function of the tax rates that are applied to the different factor incomes and
consumption goods, τ = (τ1, . . . , τJ). This gives rj(τ).
Letting Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qJ) be the vector of market prices, the indirect util-
ity function for individual i is then given by Vi(Q; y), with expenditure function
ei(Q;V ) and associated equivalent income function νi provided by
νi(Q
R;Q; yi) ≡ ei(QR;V (Q; yi)), (3)
where QR acts as a vector of “reference” prices qRj . The equivalent function
νi(Q
R;Q; y) gives the level of exogenous income that is needed for i to enjoy
utility Vi(Q; y) at prices QR.
To compute the individual welfare effect of a marginal change in prices, we
fix reference prices to the initial ones (Q = QR) and note that the effect of such a
marginal change on equivalent income is given by
∂νi(Q
R;Q; yi))
∂qj
∣∣∣∣
Q=QR
=
∂ei(Q
R;V (Q; yi))
∂V (Q; yi)
∣∣∣∣
Q=QR
∂V (Q, yi))
∂qj
∣∣∣∣
Q=QR
(4)
=
[
∂V (QR; yi)
∂y
]−1 [
∂V (QR; yi)
∂y
] [−xji (QR)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
by Roy’s identity
(5)
= −xji
(
QR
)
, (6)
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where xji
(
QR
)
is demand at prices QR. The total differential of the equivalent
income function is then given by:
dνi(Q
R;Q; y) =
K∑
j=1
∂νi(Q
R;Q; yi))
∂qj
∣∣∣∣
Q=QR
dqj
= −
K∑
j=1
xji
(
QR
)
dqj. (7)
This is the total change in individual welfare2. As is customary, we measure initial
welfare Y by the sum of exogenous income and factor incomes:
Yi = yi −
K∑
j=J+1
qRj x
j
i
(
QR
)
. (8)
Let F (y) be the cumulative distribution function of Y , and let Y (p) denote the
quantile of initial individual welfare at rank (or percentile) p.3 Roughly speaking,
Y (p) is the initial welfare of the individual whose rank is p in the Y distribution.
At rank p in the Y distribution, the effect on individual welfare of a marginal
change in the price of good j is then
Bj(p;QR) = −xj(p;QR)dqj, (9)
where xj(p;QR) is the consumption of good j at rank p. The combined effect at
p of the marginal changes in all prices is then
B(p;QR) =
K∑
j=1
Bj(p;QR), (10)
and the cumulative effect up to rank p is given by
CB(p;QR) =
∫ p
0
B(q;QR)dq. (11)
2This is strictly valid only for small (infinitesimal) price changes. For price changes that are
not infinitely small, the impact on an exact measure of individual welfare differs from (7) by about
one half the compensated price elasticity of good j times dqj/qj — see Duclos, Makdissi, and
Wodon (2004). ) Take for instance the case of a good whose compensated price elasticity equals
1, and note from Tables 3 that the price changes modelled in this paper do not exceed 17%. Using
(7) to approximate the impact of a 17% increase in the price of that good will then lead to an error
of about 8.5% in the estimate of the total welfare change induced by that price change. An error
of that magnitude would seem reasonably small enough for the purposes of this paper.
3Y (p) is given by F−1(p), the (left) inverse of F (y), namely by F−1(p) = inf{s >
0 |F (s) ≥ p} .
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2.2.2 The impact of price changes on social welfare
Estimating the impact of price changes on social welfare poses a second fun-
damental problem since any particular selection of functional form and parameters
for a social evaluation function (SEF) necessarily embodies arbitrary value judge-
ments. To address this problem, we will assess the impact of price changes on
classes of SEFs.
It is useful to define these classes by referring to “orders of normative judge-
ments”4. A normative judgement of order s is characterized by a set of normative
properties that SEFs must respect, and thus serves to define a class of SEFs also
of order s. A first natural normative property is that a society should be judged
improved whenever the welfare of one of its members increases and no one else’s
income decreases — we will refer to this below as the Paretian property. Another
natural property is that SEFs should be anonymous in individual welfare; viz, per-
muting welfare across individuals should not affect the value of the functions. The
class of first-order SEFs then regroups all of the functions that are Paretian and
that obey the anonymity property.
Note that this framework is general enough to let first-order SEFs use individ-
ual welfare levels that are censored at z, where z can be interpreted as a “poverty
line”. Such censoring effectively limits the applicability of the Paretian property
to an interval [0, z] of individual welfare. A SEF is then insensitive to changes in
welfare outside this interval. This is equivalent to using poverty indices as special
cases of SEFs — see for instance Blackorby and Donaldson (1980) and Zheng
(1997). Because of this, the SEFs defined above also include poverty indices.
Note also that the class of first-order SEFs is very broad. It encompasses
almost the entire set of specific SEFs and poverty indices that have been proposed
in the literature. This includes the Atkinson (1970) SEFs and the Gini SEFs (Sen
1973) as well as the very popular headcount, average poverty gap and FGT poverty
indices (see Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984).
Moving to the second-order class of SEFs is done by imposing an additional
normative property, which is that the functions must register a social improve-
ment whenever a mean-preserving redistributive transfer of individual welfare
takes place from a richer to a poorer individual. This corresponds to imposing
the well-known Pigou-Dalton principle on social judgements. The second-order
class of SEFs thus contains all of the first-order functions that are more sensitive
to changes in the welfare of the poorer than of the richer. Note therefore that all
4This paper will use only the first two orders of dominance, but the methodology could be
extended to higher-order dominance analysis.
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of the first-order functions belong to the second-order class of functions. Again,
these functions can censor individual welfare at z and thus also include poverty
indices.
Whether a GHG mitigation policy improves all of the SEFs that are members
of a class of order s is empirically tested through comparisons of stochastic dom-
inance curves, also of order s. To see this, it is useful to consider how stochastic
dominance curves are affected by changes in individual welfare brought about by
GHG mitigation policies. A stochastic dominance curve of normative order s is
given by (see Duclos and Araar 2006, Part III)
P (z; s) =
∫ 1
0
g(p, z)s−1dp, (12)
where g(p, z) = max(0, z−Y (p)). Let f(z) ≡ F ′(z) be the density of individual
welfare at z. Using (6), the change in these curves due to a marginal change in the
price of good j is given by
MP j(z; s) =
∂P (z; s)
∂qj
∣∣∣∣
Q=QR
(13)
=
{ −Bj(F−1(z);QR)f(z) if s = 1,
−(s− 1)
[∫ 1
0
g(p; z)(s−2)Bj(p;QR)dp
]
if s > 1.
(14)
The total differential of the dominance curves — namely, the total effect on the
dominance curves of the changes in all prices — is then
MP(z; s) =
J∑
j=1
MP j(z; s)dqj (15)
=
{ −B(F−1(z);QR)f(z) if s = 1,
−(s− 1) ∫ p
0
g(p, z)(s−2)B(p;QR)dq if s > 1.
(16)
Letting z+ be an upper bound for the intervals [0, z] of individual welfare in
which we may be interested, we can then state the following result:
Theorem 1 The following conditions are equivalent:
1. A GHG mitigation policy improves social welfare for all social evaluation
functions that are anonymous, Paretian and whose individual indicators of
welfare are censored at no more than z+;
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2. A GHG mitigation policy decreases poverty for all of the poverty indices
that are anonymous, Paretian and whose poverty line is no greater than z+;
3. The post-GHG mitigation policy first-order dominates the pre-policy distri-
bution up to z+;
4.
B(p;QR) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ [0, F (z+)]; (17)
5.
MP(ζ; s = 0) ≤ 0 ∀ζ ∈ [0, z+]. (18)
Proof. See the appendix.
Imposing the Pigou-Dalton property on the SEFs leads to the following equiv-
alent conditions:
Theorem 2 The following conditions are equivalent:
1. A GHG mitigation policy improves social welfare for all social evaluation
functions that are anonymous, Paretian, obey the Pigou-Dalton principle,
and whose individual indicators of welfare are censored at no more than
z+;
2. A GHG mitigation policy decreases poverty for all of the poverty indices
that are anonymous, Paretian, obey the Pigou-Dalton principle and whose
poverty line is no greater than z+;
3. The post-GHG mitigation policy second-order dominates the pre-policy dis-
tribution up to z+;
4.
CB(p;QR) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ [0, F (z+)]; (19)
5.
MP(ζ; s = 1) ≤ 0 ∀ζ ∈ [0, z+]. (20)
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1.
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2.2.3 Group and price effects
We can expect price changes to contribute differently, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, to MP(z; s) and thus to conditions (17), (18), (19) and (20). We
will explore this below by decomposing (15) across various scenarios into a sum
of MP j(z; s)dqj .
We can also wish to decompose MP(z; s) by population subgroups, distin-
guished by socio-economic characteristics, in order to check whether a GHG mit-
igation policy will benefit unambiguously all such groups, and, if not, which are
the winning and losing groups from such a policy, and which will weigh most
in the overall gain or loss to society. This will be particularly useful in a con-
text in which the socio-economic groups that form a society are heterogeneous in
terms of consumption behavior and factor endowments, since it is in those cases
that uniform price changes across a society can lead to heterogeneity in welfare
impacts.
To see how to do this, let g = 1, ..., G represent G exclusive and exhaus-
tive socio-economic groups. Let the population share of group g equal pig,
and let group g’s normalized density of welfare at z be given by fg(z), with∫
fg(z)dz = 1 and
∑G
g=1 pig = 1. Let x
j
g(p;Q) be the average consumption of
good j among those in group g who are also at rank p in the population distribu-
tion of welfare. We can then denote Bjg(p;Q
R) = −xjg(p;QR)dqj as the loss of
group g’s welfare at rank p that comes from an increase in the price of good j,
Bg(p;Q
R) =
∑K
j=1B
j
g(p;Q
R) as the combined welfare loss on group g at p that
results from all price changes, and CB g(p;QR) =
∫ F−1(p)
0
Bg(F (z);Q
R)fg(z)dz
as the price changes’ cumulative effect on group g up to rank p. For first-order
and second-order dominance, we then define
MP g(z; s) =
{ −Bg(F−1(z);QR) if s = 1,
−CB g(F (z);QR) if s = 2, (21)
and can then re-express MP(z; s) in (15) as
MP(z; s) =
G∑
g=1
pigfg(z)MP g(z; s). (22)
The population MP(z; s) is thus a mean (weighted by population shares) of the
changes in welfare across groups. It can therefore happen that the conditions of
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Theorems 1 and 2 may hold at the population level, but not at some subgroup
level. We will explore this further in Section 4.
3 Data and simulation description
3.1 Data
Two types of data sets are used in this study. The first pertains to the calibra-
tion of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, and the second, which
consists of household-level data, is used for the dominance analysis. The cali-
bration of the CGE model is based on the social accounting matrix (SAM) and
on industrial and household CO2 emissions data for the 2004 Canadian economy.
The latter is the latest year for which we were able to obtain the full Canadian
household survey dataset.
A SAM consistently presents transaction flows among economic agents and
production factors by combining data from input-output tables and national in-
come accounts, trade statistics and government accounts. The SAM’s input-output
section is extremely useful for the breakdown of CO2 emissions by industry and
by fuel type. The SAM used in this study was built using the input-output table of
2002 produced by Statistics Canada. This SAM is consistent with the latest avail-
able detailed CO2 emissions by industry and by fuel of the same year, also pro-
duced by Statistics Canada. Using the RAS method5, we updated the input-output
table and the 2002 emissions data to obtain input-output data that are consistent
with national account data and total 2004 CO2 emissions.
Among other characteristics, the SAM distinguishes 61 industries, 65 com-
modities, one representative household, two primary factors, i.e., labour and cap-
ital, and one consolidated government sector. The extraneous behavioral parame-
ters used in the calibration process consist essentially of the values of substitution
elasticities in the CES and CET functions used for representing household prefer-
ences, firm technology and trade relationships. Due to space constraints, we only
present in Table 1 the ranges of the values of these external parameters that are
similar to the ones used in other studies on the Canadian economy (Ab Iorwerth
et al, 2000; and Wigle, 2001).
The dominance analysis is performed using the 2004 Canadian Survey of
Household Spending (SHS) carried out by Statistics Canada. This survey provides
detailed information on household income and expenditures including gasoline
5See Bacharach (1970)
15
and other energy goods. It is a nationwide survey that covers 98% of the popu-
lation of private households in Canada’s 10 provinces. Households are asked to
provide information that includes among other items, their expenditures on goods
and services, their dwelling characteristics and their annual income for the year
2004.
The original sample covered 20,446 households. Because of non-responses,
refusals, and other factors, only 14,154 households are used in this paper. The
survey uses a stratified double-stage sampling approach in which clusters are se-
lected in the first stage from the Canadian Labor Force Survey sampling frame,
and households are then selected in the second stage within the selected clusters.
In order to be representative of the population, the survey also provides weights
computed from the sampling frame of the 2001 census of the Canadian popu-
lation. In addition to using household size and household sampling weights to
weight households, all monetary variables are expressed in per capita terms. This
is because it is individual welfare that matters, although consumption is observed
at the household level.
Data on household spending cover outlays on 21 commodities; income vari-
ables include labor income, investment income and other income. As is usual
in many countries, consumption expenditures from surveys of household spend-
ing do not match exactly those found in the system of national accounts, in part
because of methodological and classification differences. As a result, the map-
ping between the two classifications of goods and services is not straightforward.
The commodity disaggregation used in the CGE model, which is an aggregation
of commodities in Statistics Canada’s input-output table (at the “L-level” of 113
industries), is richer than the one in the survey of household spending (65 com-
modities in the former vs. 21 in the latter). We mapped each commodity in the
SHS to the closest possible match in the model disaggregation. This mapping is
later used for aggregating the price impacts from one sectoral disaggregation to
the other.
3.2 Description of policy experiments
We run three CGE simulations with different policy settings to assess the im-
pacts on commodity prices and primary factor incomes of reducing combustion
CO2 emissions, i.e., those associated with the use of fossil fuels in Canada. We
opt to reduce these emissions by 15% in comparison to the benchmark situation.
As mentioned above, the choice of this magnitude of abatement is for illustrative
purposes alone and does not have a precise link with an official GHG policy in
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Canada.
In all simulations, a cap-and-trade domestic emissions trading (DET) system
is used to lower CO2 emission to the desired level. In the DET, the requirement
to hold permits for all residual units of emissions would increase the user price
of fossil fuels. We consider the implementation of an upstream permit system in
which all users of fossil fuels (for final demand and for intermediate inputs) would
pay for the cost of the permits. Since a ceiling is put on total emissions and in-
ternational permits are not available, the permit price is endogenously determined
by the model so as to achieve the specified target. The three simulations differ by
the recycling method of the permit proceeds.
In the first simulation (named OBA), the permit revenue is used to provide re-
bates to firms for the permit cost they incur. The value of the rebate is the product
of current output, of the adjusted benchmark emission intensity, and of the permit
price. In the OBA DET firms are initially assigned a benchmark emission intensity
that will be used to compute the rebate. These benchmark emission intensities are
endogenously adjusted by a common scaleback factor in order to equalize govern-
ment revenue-recycling expenditures and actual subsidies received by firms. As
discussed in Dissou (2006) and Bernard, Fischer, and Fox (2007), this form of re-
bate, which is gaining popularity among policy makers and researchers, provides
an output subsidy. Although OBA does provide firms an incentive to reduce their
actual emissions intensity, it does not provide them an incentive also to reduce
their output in order to cut total emissions. As a consequence, firms will reduce
less their use of labor and capital in the OBA system. Note that the firm’s actual
emissions intensity after abatement is not necessarily identical to the benchmark
value that is used to determine the rebate. Depending on the permit price, actual
emissions intensity might increase in comparison to its benchmark value in some
industries, while it might decrease in other industries. The difference in actual
emissions intensities achieved by firms is the main driver of emissions trading in
this closed system. Over-performing firms that reduce their emissions so as to re-
duce their emissions intensity below the assigned level will sell emissions credits
to under-performing firms.
In the second simulation, named RPT, the permit proceeds are used to reduce
the payroll taxes paid by firms to the government. Finally, in the third simulation
named UCS, permit proceeds are used to reduce existing consumption taxes on
all goods by a uniform percentage. This could be seen as a uniform subsidy on
consumption goods.
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4 Results and discussions
4.1 CGE results
We first present a cursory review of the general equilibrium results of the three
simulations in order to help grasp the source of the consumption and factor price
changes that are used in the distributive analysis. Table 3 presents the price im-
pacts of the GHG mitigation policy in the three simulations using the disaggrega-
tion present in the SHS data. As alluded to previously, the price impacts in that
table are obtained by aggregating the consumption price impacts generated by the
model using a mapping between the models sectoral disaggregation and that of
the SHS.
As is usual in a CGE, the final impacts on prices cannot be isolated from
changes in quantities and changes in aggregate variables. Table 2 reports the im-
pacts on some aggregate variables and the Annex Table 4 shows the impact on
sectoral real variables using the original model disaggregation. Even though the
results in the latter table are not directly used in the dominance analysis, they help
in understanding the magnitudes and the signs of the price changes. Due to space
constraints, we only present the sectoral results for real variables related to the
first OBA simulation with an output-based allocation of permits.
As shown in Table 3, in the three simulations, energy prices increase in con-
formity with the main objective of market-based instruments that aim at reducing
the use of fossil fuels through an increase in prices. The latter increase is brought
about by the cost of emissions abatement and the requirement to buy permits for
residual emissions. The prices of the tradable permits are $16.0, $12.6, and $12.4
per ton of CO2 in, respectively, OBA, RPT and UCS. The higher cost of permits
in OBA is by no means a surprise. Indeed, as it has been pointed out by previous
studies (Dissou 2006, and Bernard, Fischer, and Fox 2007) that a main draw-
back of a DET with output-based allocation of permits is the large increase in the
marginal cost of abatement that is a consequence of the indirect output subsidy
provided to firms.
The prices of fossil energy products increase within a range of 9.6% for nat-
ural gas under UCS to 16.6% for gasoline under OBA. The ranking of the price
changes of energy fossil products in the three scenarios follows that of the permit
price. The increases in the prices of fossil energy products under OBA are higher
than those in RPT, which are larger than those in UCS. The small magnitude of the
change in the price of electricity is due to the significant share of hydroelectricity
(around 40%) in total electricity generation in Canada. In the OBA simulation,
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the price of electricity even decreases slightly as a result of the output subsidy.
As expected, Table 4 shows a fall in the demand for energy products; a change in
the demand composition toward non-energy goods is also observed. In general,
and in comparison with the benchmark situation, the supply of non-energy goods
increases (or falls less) than that of energy goods.
The increases in energy prices affect negatively energy-intensive industries
through a cost-push shock that puts an upward pressure on the prices of their
products. Still, in a general equilibrium context, this negative supply shock should
not necessarily translate into an increase in the prices of energy-intensive goods
because of the potential negative effects on demand also initiated by the energy
price increase. For, as shown in Table 3, as energy prices rise, returns to labor and
capital could fall, and household real income could thereby drop. This is particular
true in the UCS where these factors do not benefit from any positive measure from
revenue recycling. Labour and capital remunerations fall by respectively 0.69 %
and 1.46% under UCS. In the RPT scenario, the rental rate of capital decreases
by 1.69% while the wage rate increase thanks to the reduction in payroll taxes.
Under OBA, both factors benefit from the output subsidy and their remunerations
increase slightly.
The changes in factor incomes affect household demand for goods and in some
scenarios dampen the initial upward pressure on the prices of energy-intensive
goods. When the downward pressure on these prices dominates the ascending
movement, the prices of most goods decline. Referring to Table 3, the prices of
non-energy goods fall by a higher magnitude in the UCS scenario where both
labour and capital incomes fall, in comparison with the two the simulations where
the returns to one or to both factors increase. Partial equilibrium analyses that
consider the change in energy prices alone cannot account for the impact on other
prices. This result provides a strong case for using a general equilibrium frame-
work when the change in energy prices has strong spill-over effects. Overall,
aggregate household real consumption increases the most under RPT (0.35%) and
decreases by 0.27% under OBA.
The simulation results confirm the view of Fullerton and Heutel (2007) on
the impact of GHG abatement policies on the relative return of capital vs labour.
They argue that, as polluting industries are capital intensive in comparison to non-
polluting ones, abatement policies are more likely to depress the return to capital
more than the return to labor. The rental rate of capital is more affected than the
wage rate; the former decrease more (or increases less) than the latter. As affluent
consumers derive a higher share of their income from capital than less affluent
ones, this effect could have important implications regarding the distributive im-
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pact of GHG abatement policies.
4.2 Distributional analysis
We now turn to the distributive and social welfare impact of the GHG abate-
ment policies considered in this paper. Table 5 describes summarily the distribu-
tion of population shares and total expenditures. Per capita total expenditures in
Canada were about $CAN 17,600 in 2004. The majority of the population had
total per capita expenditures situated in the interval of $CAN [10, 000; 20, 000].
Figure 1 shows the estimates of the marginal impact MP(z; s), defined by (15),
of the three potential GHG mitigation policies on the first-order dominance curve,
as well as 95% confidence intervals around the estimates. All three policies have
a negative (positive) impact on welfare (poverty), which is expected since a fall
in well-being can be rationalized as the cost that society must pay to improve its
environment. UCS (“Universal Consumer Subsidy”) appears least costly; OBA
(“Output-Based Allocation of Permits”), the most. This is also the case for
second-order dominance, as shown in Figure 2.
4.2.1 Testing
Following Theorems 1 and 2, one can state formally that a GHG mitigation
policy A leads to a greater increase in social welfare for individual welfare cen-
sored at z+ (or a smaller increase in poverty for poverty lines below z+) than a
policy B at order s if and only if:
∆s(z) = MPA(z; s)−MPB(z; s) < 0 ∀ z ∈ [0, z+]. (23)
For statistical tests of dominance of one policy over another, a natural formulation
of a null hypothesis is thus that of a union of null hypotheses
H0 : ∆
s(z) < 0 for some z ∈ [0, z+] (24)
to be tested against an alternative hypothesis that is an intersection of alternative
hypotheses
H1 : ∆
s(z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ [0, z+]. (25)
The decision rule we adopt is then to reject the union set of null hypotheses (non-
dominance) in favor of the intersection set of alternative hypotheses (dominance)
only if we can reject each of the individual hypotheses in the null set at a 100 · θ%
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significance level. Graphically, this can be conveniently carried out using a 100 ·
(1− θ)% one-sided confidence interval.
To see this in greater details, denote by ∆ˆs(z) the sample estimator of ∆s(z),
by ∆s0(z) its sample value, and by σ
2
∆ˆs(z)
the sampling variance of ∆ˆs(z). Let
ζ(θ) be the (1 − θ)-quantile of the normal distribution. Given that by the law of
large numbers and the central limit theorem, all of the estimators used in this paper
can be shown to be consistent and asymptotically normally distributed, we can use
∆s0(z)±σ∆ˆs(z)ζ(θ) as alternative lower and upper bounds for one-sided confidence
intervals for ∆s(z). For instance, an upper-bounded confidence interval ∆s0(z) +
σ∆ˆs(z)ζ(θ) shows all of the values of a constant η for which we could not reject
the null hypothesis H0 : ∆s(z) > η in favor of H1 : ∆s(z) ≤ η. Our decision rule
is then to reject the set of null hypotheses (24) in favor of (25) if and only if:
∆s0(z) + σ∆ˆs(z)ζ(θ) < 0 ∀z ∈ [0, z+]. (26)
The confidence intervals that appear in Figures 1 and 2 are not sufficient to in-
fer differences in the MP(z; s) curves since the covariance between the estimates
of these curves is not null. A more useful figure shows estimates of the differences
between the MP(z; s) curves as well as the confidence intervals around these dif-
ferences, taking into account the correlation between the point estimates of the
curves. This is shown in Figure 3, where UCS statistically first-order dominates
RPT in poverty and welfare for any choice of z+ below $CAN18,600. Second
order dominance of UCS is obtained in Figure 4 for any choice of z+. Figures 5
and 6 analogously confirm the dominance of RPT over OBA. These dominance
results are summarized in Table 8.
4.2.2 Effect of price changes
To investigate the sources of the changes in welfare that the three policies
would generate, we decompose the total impact on welfare of the price changes
into a sum of Bj(p;QR) (see (9) and (10)) coming from four different sets of price
effects:
• those that arise from changes in factor prices (labor and capital);
• those that arise from changes in food prices;
• those that arise from changes in energy prices (electricity, natural gas, gaso-
line and other fuels for owned and leased vehicles);
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• and those that arise from changes in the prices of other goods and services.
Figure 7 uses non-parametric smoothing (kernel) estimation techniques to
show the impact Bj(F−1(z);QR) of each of these sets of price changes at dif-
ferent poverty lines (z) in the context of the UCS policy. A negative impact on
welfare is contributed by income and energy components and a positive one from
the change in the prices of other goods. This result is not surprising since is ex-
plained by the nature of the general equilibrium price changes shown in Table 3.
Note, however, that in Figures 8 and 9, the income change component increases
wellbeing in the context of OBA and RPT; this in fact distinguishes in large part
the OBA and RPT policies from the UCS one. For all policies, the energy effect
decreases welfare.
4.2.3 Regional tests
We can also check whether heterogeneity in consumption and factor endow-
ments across socio-economic groups means that the all-Canada results shown un-
til here do not apply uniformly across Canadian regions. We consider (21) across
four regions (percentage of the total population): Ontario (39%); Quebec (23%);
British Columbia (13%); and other provinces (24%).
Figure 10 shows the impact of the UCS policy across these different regions.
Observe that British Columbia seems to suffer least from UCS. Figure 11 shows
the upper bound of the difference between the MP(z; s) curves of the other re-
gions relative to British Columbia. The impact of UCS in British Columbia is
significantly lower than in the group of other provinces; it is also significantly
lower than in Ontario and in Quebec for intervals CAD$ [8200,∞[ and CAD$
[10000, 18300] respectively. Overall, however, the differences across regions are
not very marked. This is in part explained by the fact that per capita expendi-
tures on energy at different levels of total expenditures do not differ much across
regions, as shown in Figure 12.
4.2.4 Inequality impact
In addition to the welfare and poverty impact of GHG abatement policies,
one may also wish to know their impact on inequality and redistribution. Figure
13 graphs the expected proportional change in individual welfare induced by the
policies at different levels of per capita total expenditures. Except for the bottom
part of the distribution, the proportional change is roughly constant across levels
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of per capita total expenditures, which suggests that relative inequality indices
(such as the Gini index) would not be much affected by the policies.
To probe this further, Table 7 presents estimates of the Gini index for the pre
and post policy distributions. Overall, the policy effects on inequality is numer-
ically small. OBA and RPT policies have a slightly more pronounced impact on
inequality than UCS: they increase it significantly, as shown by the confidence
intervals of the impact estimates in Table 7. This is confirmed by the differences
between the post-policy Lorenz curves and the initial Lorenz curve that are shown
in Figure 14. Panel A shows the estimates of the differences in the curves; Panels
B, C and D plot these estimates in addition to the upper bounds of the confidence
intervals around them. This confirms that OBA and RPT would lead to a statisti-
cally significant increase in inequality.
Why this is so can be seen by assessing the impact of marginal price changes
on the Gini (G). This is given by6:
dG =
J∑
j=1
µj
µ
(G− Cj)dqj +
K∑
j=J+1
µj
µ
(Cj −G)dqj. (27)
where µj is the population mean of good j and Cj is the concentration coeffi-
cient of good j. The linearity of (27) also makes it possible to think in terms of
the combined impact of groups of goods. The results are presented in Table (8).
The changes in energy prices increase inequality for all scenarios. For the UCS
scenario, however, changes in food prices and in incomes completely offset that
increase in inequality. This evidence therefore provides an additional argument
in support of UCS as a preferable GHG policy, since UCS would not only lead
to greater welfare and lower poverty, but it would also lead to lower inequality
through its differential impact on prices.
5 Conclusions
This study analyzes the incidence on households of pollution control poli-
cies using an integrated framework combining a multi-sector general equilibrium
model with a stochastic dominance analysis that uses household-level data. A
Canadian domestic cap-and-trade emission trading (DET) system is considered in
three different settings: an output-based allocation of permits (OBA), the use of
6See Araar (2002) and Duclos and Araar (2006), Chapter 12.
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the permit proceeds to reduce payroll taxes (RPT), and the use of the same pro-
ceeds to reduce consumption taxes by providing a uniform consumption subsidy
to all commodities (UCS).
According to the results of the general equilibrium model, and as expected,
DET raises the prices of fossil energy prices so as to reduce the level of emissions
in the economy. The largest increase in these prices is observed with OBA, and
the smallest one with UCS. The main reason for this stems from the fact that OBA
provides fewer incentives to firms to reduce their output and, thereby, the permit
price required to reduce emissions is the highest with that scenario. In addition to
the change in energy prices, the general equilibrium model indicates that the price
of most non-energy goods decrease and that both the wage rate and the rental
rate of capital are affected too. Importantly, our results suggest that the return
to capital is more negatively affected than the wage rate, among other reasons
because polluting industries are relatively capital intensive.
The changes in commodity prices along with the changes in factor remunera-
tions are then applied to household-level data to perform a stochastic dominance
analysis of the incidence of alternative GHG mitigation policies. A key advantage
of this approach is that it avoids having to choose an arbitrary social evaluation
function — the choice of which could possibly affect the conclusions over the im-
pact of policies on social welfare. Our results are thus made robust to the selection
of any social evaluation function within a wide class. Statistical tests indicate that
all three GHG policies impact negatively on welfare. They also suggest that RPT
first-order welfare dominates OBA, that UCS first-order poverty dominates RPT
for any choice of poverty thresholds below $CAN 18,600, and UCS second-order
welfare (and, for all possible poverty lines, second-order poverty) dominates RPT.
Decomposing the sources of welfare changes, we also find that changes in
energy prices and in factor incomes tend to depress welfare, while changes in non-
energy commodity prices tend to increase it. Finally, OBA and RPT would lead to
a statistically significant increase in inequality (an impact which is not statistically
significant for UCS), thus providing an additional normative argument in support
of UCS as a preferable GHG policy.
6 Appendices
6.1 Theorem 1
Proof. Note first that the dominance curves in (12) can be used to order dis-
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tributions over classes of all of the SEFs that are anonymous, Paretian and whose
individual indicators of welfare are censored at no more than z+ — see for in-
stance Duclos and Araar (2006), Part III). These SEFS also include all of the
poverty indices that are anonymous, Paretian and whose poverty line is no greater
than z+. If and only if distribution B’s dominance curve in (12) is lower than that
of A over all z ∈ [0, z+], then B exhibits a greater level of social welfare than A
over all of the above first-order SEFs. A further result is that if and only if distri-
bution B’s dominance curve in (12) is lower than that of A over all z ∈ [0, z+],
then B has a lower level of poverty than A over all the first-order class of poverty
indices with z ∈ [0, z+]. This is also known as first-order dominance of B by A
over [0, z+]. The effect of a GHG mitigation policy on (12) is given by (14). (12)
will therefore be pushed down over all [0, z+] by a GHG mitigation policy if and
only if (14) is negative over all [0, z+], namely, if and only if (17) and (18) hold.
25
Figure 1: Change in first-order dominance curves following GHG mitigation poli-
cies
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Figure 2: Change in second-order dominance curves following GHG mitigation
policies
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Figure 3: Difference between the first-order impact MP(z ; s = 1 ) of UCS and
RPT mitigation policies
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Figure 4: Difference between the second-order impact MP(z ; s = 2 ) of UCS and
RPT mitigation policies
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Figure 5: Difference between the first-order impact MP(z ; s = 1 ) of RPT and
OBA mitigation policies
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Figure 6: Difference between the second-order impact MP(z ; s = 2 ) of RPT and
OBA mitigation policies
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Figure 7: Impact Bj(F−1(z);QR) of different sources j of welfare changes at
different levels of per capita expenditures (z) following a UCS policy
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Figure 8: Impact Bj(F−1(z);QR) of different sources j of welfare changes at
different levels of per capita expenditures (z) following an OBA policy
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Figure 9: Impact Bj(F−1(z);QR) of different sources j of welfare changes at
different levels of per capita expenditures (z) following a RPT policy
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Figure 10: Impact of UCS policy across different Canadian regions, at different
levels of per capita expenditures (z)
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Figure 11: Upper bound of the confidence interval of the difference in the im-
pact of a UCS policy across Canadian regions, at different levels of per capita
expenditures (z)
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Figure 12: Per capita expenditures on energy across regions
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Figure 13: Proportional change in individual welfare at different levels z of per
capita expenditures, following three possible GHG mitigation policies
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Table 1: Elasticities of substitution in technology used in the model
Values or range
Between value added and index of intermediate inputs 0.2-1
Between capital and index of stationary energy inputs 0.21-1.5
Between electricity and non-motive fossil energy inputs 0.49-1.55
Between refined petroleum products and other non-motive fossil fuels 0.1-4
Among refined petroleum products 1
Between non-energy intermediate inputs and motive fuels 0.1-0.83
Among motive fuels 1
Between capital-energy and labour 1
Among non-energy intermediate inputs 0
Source: simulation results
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Table 2: Aggregate impacts of 15 percent reductions inCO2 emissions in different
simulations (percentage change from base case)
Output-based Reduction Uniform
allocation in payroll consumption
of permits taxes subsidy
Real GDP at market prices -0.15 0.06 -0.15
Labour supply 0.03 0.35 0.02
Consumption price index 0.51 0.33 0.33
Rental rate of capital 0.22 -1.29 -1.46
Nominal wage rate 0.26 0.85 -0.69
Household real consumption -0.27 0.35 0.08
Equivalent variation in % of non-labour income
Government total revenue 2.83 2.35 1.35
Price of carbon permit 16.04 12.59 12.41
Percentage reduction in industrial emissions -16.23 -17.02 -16.96
Percentage reduction in household emissions -11.00 -8.32 -8.53
Percentage reduction in total emissions -15.00 -15.00 -15.00
Source: simulation results
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Table 3: Impacts on consumption prices of 15 percent reduction in CO2 emissions
in different simulations (percentage change from base case)
Output-based Reduction Uniform
allocation in payroll consumption
of permits taxes subsidy
Energy
Electricity -3.64 1.95 0.84
Natural gas 11.00 11.07 9.64
Other fuel 12.89 12.10 11.26
Gasoline & other fuels for vehicles 16.57 16.37 15.39
Non-energy commodities
Food -0.02 0.05 -0.95
Shelter without water fuel & electricity 0.18 -0.94 -2.06
Water & sewage 0.42 0.45 -0.63
Household operation 0.21 -0.52 -1.47
Household furnishings & equipment 0.15 -0.26 -1.17
Clothing 0.08 -0.20 -1.06
Transportation without gasoline -0.18 1.41 0.39
Health care 0.20 -0.55 -1.53
Personal care 0.26 -0.28 -1.26
Recreation -0.85 -0.33 -1.03
Entertainment -0.85 -0.33 -1.03
Recreation facilities -0.85 -0.33 -1.03
Package trips -0.85 -0.33 -1.03
Reading materials -0.61 -0.07 -1.02
Education 0.17 -0.50 -1.45
Tobacco & alcohol 0.10 -0.56 -0.98
Miscellaneous expenditures 0.08 -0.19 -1.04
Source: simulation results
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Table 5: Distribution of per capita total expenditures in 2004 Canada ($CAD)
Intervals of per capita Population Average expenditures
total expenditures shares per capita in the interval
0 - 5000 0.020 3833
5000 - 10000 0.178 7975
10000 - 15000 0.300 12471
15000 - 20000 0.216 17251
20000 - 25000 0.118 22253
25000 - 30000 0.071 27236
30000 + 0.098 41760
Total population 1.000 17597
Table 6: Intervals (in $CAD) over which row policies statistically dominate col-
umn policies
First order Second order
UCS RPT OBA UCS RPT OBA
UCS — [0, 18600] [0, ∞[ — [0, ∞[ [0, ∞[
RPT — [0, ∞[ — — [0, ∞[
OBA — — — — — —
40
Table 7: Impact of GHG mitigation policies on inequality
Distributions Gini Standard error Confidence interval (95%)
Lower Upper
Initial 0.29619 0.00329 0.28974 0.30265
UCS 0.29627 0.0033 0.28981 0.30273
OBA 0.29703 0.0033 0.29056 0.30350
RPT 0.29708 0.0033 0.29061 0.30355
Difference STD Confidence interval (95%)
UCS-Initial 0.00008 0.00006 -0.00003 0.00019
OBA-Initial 0.00083 0.00005 0.00074 0.00092
RPT-Initial 0.00088 0.00007 0.00075 0.00102
Table 8: The impact of price changes on the Gini index, by scenario and by group
of goods and income sources
UCS RPT OBA
Food -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Energy 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006
Other services 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0001
Income -0.0004 0.0004 0.0001
Total 0.0000 0.0008 0.0008
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